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Abstract 
The present article proposes to re-examine the parity-of-reasoning or double-standard fallacy 
argument, which favours a time-symmetric Gold universe model over a cosmological arrow of time. 
There are two reasons for this re-examination. One is empirical: 1) the recent discovery of an 
expanding and accelerating universe questions the symmetry assumption of the Gold universe on 
empirical grounds; 2) the other is theoretical: the argument from t-symmetry fails to take into 
account some important aspects of the topology of phase space and recently developed typicality 
arguments. If the parity-of-reasoning argument, which depends on the t-symmetry of probability, is 
reconsidered in terms of the topology of phase space and typicality arguments, the double-standard 
fallacy argument loses much of its appeal. The Gold universe model itself suffers from unexplained 
dynamic asymmetries. The upshot of this paper is that the Gold universe model is implausible or far 
less plausible than asymmetric models. 
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I. Introduction 
One of the most challenging problems in the physics and philosophy of time remains the 
question of the cosmological arrow of time. One familiar account holds that the arrow of 
time does not derive from, say, the validity of the Second law of thermodynamics alone but 
requires particular low-entropy boundary conditions at the birth of the universe to bestow 
an arrow of time on its cosmological evolution. If such an arrow exists, then initial and final 
conditions of the universe are very different, for instance in terms of their entropic states. 
This approach, however, faces a fundamental objection, namely that it ‘favours’ initial over 
final conditions. This problem is best known as the ‘double standard fallacy’. The fallacy 
concerns the assumption of a cosmological arrow of time, which factors in ‘initial’ conditions 
but neglects ‘final’ conditions and assumes that the universe will evolve from a state of 
lower to a state of higher entropy. This account of the cosmological arrow of time falls foul 
of what has also been dubbed the parity-of-reasoning argument. (Sklar 1993; Price 1996; 
Schulman 1997) Hence symmetry between initial and final conditions, rather than 
asymmetry should be the default position. It should not be assumed, without further 
argument, that cosmological evolution is asymmetric. Rather, the default position should be 
a Gold universe model, which treats initial and final conditions of the universe as symmetric, 
i.e. the entropy is assumed to be low (or high respectively) at both ends of the lifeline of the 
universe.  
There are two reasons for reviewing the argument for a Gold universe from temporal 
symmetry: 1) A Gold universe model seems to be excluded on empirical grounds. Cosmology 
has made significant empirical discoveries about the evolution of the universe since the 
1990s: the evolution of the universe is no longer expected to end in a Big Crunch – the time-
reverse of the Big Bang – but in a Big Chill. (Cf. Krauss/Scherrer 2008; North 2002) 2) But 
there is also a theoretical argument. The argument from t-symmetry does not take into 
account some important aspects of the topology of phase space and recently developed 
typicality arguments. When this is done, as the present article aims to show, the argument 
from double standards loses much of its appeal.  
II. The Argument from Symmetry 
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The insistence on parity-of-reasoning, coupled with the desire to avoid ‘temporal 
chauvinism’ (Carroll 2010, 288), is usually justified by appeal to the temporal neutrality of 
the notion of probability. Price (1996), for instance, argues for a view from Nowhere – an 
atemporal or Archimedean standpoint – which stipulates symmetry between the initial and 
final conditions of the universe. It is claimed that the ‘atemporal view’ avoids ‘double 
standards’, which means that it does not rely on statistical arguments in one time direction 
only. The view from Nowhere expects ‘entropy to increase in both directions’ unless there is 
a future constraint. 
Parity-of-reasoning requires that inferences into the past and future be treated as 
symmetrical. (Sklar 1995) Statistical reasoning about the evolution of thermodynamic 
systems of the universe contains no in-built asymmetry. If entropy is expected to increase in 
the future – barring some future constraint (Price 1996, 20) – statistical reasoning alone 
requires that we should expect it to increase into the past. In order to avoid double 
standards the statistical argument must not be restricted to one direction of time (usually 
the future direction). Without the ‘favouring’ of initial conditions there is no reason to 
assume that entropy will rise towards the future. However, if initial conditions are factored 
in, as St. Hawking complains, ‘the second law is really a tautology.’  Entropy increases with 
time because ‘we define the direction of time to be that in which entropy increases.’ 
(Hawking 1994, 348) 
Statistical reasoning thus leads to the postulation of two-time boundary conditions of the 
universe. Models with two-time boundary conditions are known as Gold universe models, 
according to which initial and final conditions are approximately identical. In the usual Gold 
model scenario the universe starts in a low-entropy past and ends in a low-entropy future, 
with the possibility that a future collapse could influence cosmic events today, through 
some form of retro-causality. (Schulman 1997) The reason for a consideration of two-time 
boundary conditions is that symmetry is a fundamental motivation in scientific reasoning, 
which avoids temporal bias. For instance, the fundamental equations of physics are said to 
be time-reversal invariant, which means that the equations allow both time-forward and 
time-reversed states as possible solutions. (See Lebowitz 1994; Earman 2002) It is usually 
assumed that a Gold universe undergoes a cycle from a Big Bang to a Big Crunch (Price 1996, 
81-2; Carroll 2010, 347-8; see Figure Ia), although there seems to be no strong evidence in 
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Gold’s writings for such an interpretation. Gold regards the universe, due to its expansion, 
as a radiation heat sink, which leads to asymmetric boundary conditions. In Gold’s model 
the entropic arrow tracks the cosmic arrow, with the consequence that the arrow of time 
can be reversed. (See Gold 1962; 1966; 1974) Many cosmological models assume a de facto 
low-entropy past, but far fewer assume a low-entropy future. But from the symmetric point 
of view low entropy boundary conditions need explaining whilst high entropy conditions 
both at the beginning and end of the universe’s history are expected. At any rate, if the 
elegance of symmetry is valued and double standards are to be avoided, it is reasonable to 
envisage an alternative Gold universe, one that starts and ends in a high entropy state. 
(Figure Ib) 
 
 
The symmetry view satisfies the theoretical demand for symmetry, at least for the 
symmetry of the boundary conditions, but there is little factual support for the Gold 
universe. Recent Nobel Prize winning discoveries have shown that the expansion of the 
universe is in fact accelerating (Krauss/Scherrer 2008; Schmidt 2005) and that there is no 
evidence of a future low-entropy state. Furthermore, a number of cosmological models are 
now available, which no longer stipulate low entropy initial conditions but derive them from 
pre-Big Bang scenarios. (Carroll 2010; Penrose 2010) 
t2future t2future t1present t1present to to 
Figure I a, b: The Gold universe and its inverse   
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The lack of evidence for any future constraint, the discovery of an accelerated expansion of 
the universe, hurling towards a Big Chill (rather than a Big Crunch) and the de facto 
existence of a low-entropy Big Bang pose problems for two-time boundary scenarios. In 
terms of the ‘parity-of-reasoning’ objection, however, the logical problem remains, namely 
to investigate the cosmological properties of the universe without favouring initial 
conditions. 
T-symmetric models rely on the temporal symmetry of statistical reasoning. But even if the 
empirical fact of an expanding universe is ignored it turns out that a t-symmetric model 
suffers from unexplained dynamic asymmetries, which make it implausible. They emerge if 
we consider arguments from the topology of phase space and typicality arguments, contrary 
to the parity-of-reasoning demand, they arrive at an arrow of time. This discrepancy gives 
rise to the question whether an unjustified favouring of initial conditions can be avoided, 
whilst accounting for the observable, de facto, entropy increase in the universe. 
III. The Argument from Asymmetry 
The argument from asymmetry usually starts from the postulation of low-entropy initial 
conditions but this postulation is subject to the double-standard fallacy argument. Hence an 
argument from asymmetry should attempt to show that asymmetry can be obtained 
without favouring initial conditions. Attempts in these directions have concentrated either 
on the topology of phase space (Section III) or on the notion of typicality (Section IV; 
Earman’s ‘time direction heresy’ will be briefly considered in this section). The question is 
whether a consideration of the structure and volume of phase space can avoid the parity-of-
reasoning argument over and above the empirical fact that the universe is most likely to end 
in a Big Chill rather than a Big Crunch. 
A classical system in mechanics is standardly described in terms of a 6N-dimensional phase 
space, , in which each individual particle has three position coordinates (x, y, z) and three 
momentum coordinates (since ‘momentum = mass x velocity’ is a vector quantity). Single 
particle systems or many particle systems are represented by a single point , its micro-
state, which moves around in phase space according to the deterministic laws of 
Hamiltonian mechanics. Phase space is an expression of the number of ways in which a 
macro-state, like temperature, can be realized by a configuration of micro-states. The phase 
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space usually comes endowed with a Lebesque measure, , which roughly is a volume 
measure of the phase space, available to the systems. For Hamiltonian systems the 
Lebesque measure is invariant under the dynamics; this statement is equivalent to the 
Liouville theorem, which asserts that the dynamics preserves the phase-space volumes. 
To any particular macro-state, Mi (i = 1…m), of which there is assumed to be a finite number, 
there corresponds a number of micro-states, which make up the macro-state.1A macro-
region, Mi (1im), characterizes the area for which the region is in macro-state Mi, and 
which contains all the macro-states, which correspond to Mi. The different sizes of M, and 
hence the difference in the volume values of |𝑀|, depend on the number of states, which 
make up the macro-regions, and the amount of spreading. As is well-known from 
Boltzmann’s entropy equation, almost all the phase points, which are initially in Mi will 
evolve (if the dynamics is undisturbed) to newly available regions of phase space, such that 
the system will eventually reach equilibrium state, Meq.  
Liouville’s theorem in classical mechanics states that a volume element along a flowline 
preserves the classical distribution function drdvvrf ),( : 
   vrtfdvvdrrdttf ,,,,  . 
(Kittel/Kroemer 1980, 408; Albert 2000, 73f)   
Liouville’s theorem says that the dynamic evolution of a classical system preserves the 
volume of the initial phase-space region but not its shape. The shape of the phase-space 
region can become very unstructured, disordered, a physical state for the description of 
which sometimes the term ‘fibrillation’ is used. (Sklar 1993, 55-6; Penrose 2010, 25-34) A 
rather uniform (smooth) region in the initial stage of dynamic evolution can become very 
fibrillated since the shape of phase space regions is not invariant. The division of phase 
space into different cells – with different topology – is known as ‘coarse-graining’. That is, 
the volume of the available phase space regions is invariant over time even though the 
                                                          
1
 The converse does not hold: to one particular micro-state there corresponds exactly one macro-state, which 
can be regarded as a snapshot of the micro-states, which make up a particular macro-state at a moment in 
time. As a macro-state, like temperature T, is defined as mean molecular kinetic energy, many particular 
configurations of the micro-states can constitute the particular macro-state, T.  
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motion of point X along an evolution curve within this volume can start from smooth initial 
states or end up in fibrillated final configurations. 
When speaking of the space volume of a particular macro-system, like a gas, some care 
must be taken as to the precise meaning of this term. When Maxwell’s Demon sits in a 
sealed container, with a small opening in a partition wall, which allows the Demon to 
separate the slow from the fast molecules, he is confined to a three-dimensional Euclidean 
space. The phase space of such a gas is fixed and does not change with time. It describes 
every possible state, which a system may occupy. (Cf. Carroll 2010, 336, 340-2; Penrose 
2005, 701) However, an n-particle system in 6N-dimensional phase-space can move along 
different evolution curves, according to deterministic laws. The phase space remains 
invariant but the configurations within that state – the shape of the coarse-grained cells – 
will change and evolve. Although a number of evolution curves are available to the system, 
it may not actually occupy all these curves.  
 In a more mathematical sense a 6N-dimensional abstract phase space, , describes all the 
particle states, which belong to the system. If energy conservation is taken into account, 
‘the motion of the system is confined to a (6N-1)-dimensional energy hypersurface E’ 
which describes the phase space available to the evolution curves (or phase flow φt). (See 
Werndl 2013, 471) When phase space (or the space of states) is conceived as the phase 
space of all the possible states, which a system could hypothetically occupy, the reversibility 
of the fundamental equations requires that this available phase space remain invariant. (Cf. 
Carroll 2010, 336, 340-2; Penrose 2005, 701) The phase space must remain invariant if the 
trajectories are allowed, in theory, to return to their initial conditions. According to the 
Liouville theorem,  is a volume-preserving measure. But asymmetry between the initial 
and final states or the coarse-grained regions implies some evolution: what changes is not 
the number of accessible regions of phase space but the number of actual configurations, 
which occupy phase space at any given time before reaching equilibrium. That is, the 
volume of phase space, which the configurations actually occupy before reaching 
equilibrium, is smaller than the volume of phase space available to them. Due to the 
difference between phase space accessed and phase space accessible, the system evolves, 
such that the equilibrium macro-state is larger than any other state. In terms of initial and 
final conditions this evolution means that, although the volumes remain invariant under 
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Liouville’s theorem topologically they differ (they are not shape-preserving under Liouville’s 
theorem and de facto a continuous undoing of final conditions requires highly atypical fine-
tuning). This measure of fibrillation or spreading refers to both senses of the phase space. 
For both the phase space in the sense of all hypothetical possible states and the phase space 
of the occupied space see their volumes but not their topology preserved. 
As a system, like the universe, undergoes expansion, it begins to occupy different volumes, 
due to the different configurations it can occupy – for instance |𝑀𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑢𝑚|»|𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 | – 
and these different volumes allow the construction of volume ratios – |𝑀𝑖|/ |𝑀𝑒𝑞| – which 
become important for asymmetry arguments. Eddington regarded these volume differences 
as another criterion – apart from entropy – for a cosmological arrow of time. (Eddington 
1935, 67-8) But an immediate consequence of this theorem is that even though the volume 
is preserved the shape of this macro-region is not preserved and this implies a dynamic 
evolution of the states along evolution curves within the accessible phase space region. For 
two coarse-grained regions cannot differ from each other without an evolution of the states 
from occupied to accessible space.  It also implies that a reversed evolution of the 
trajectories will preserve the volume but not necessarily the shape, unless very special 
conditions apply.  Hence a bundle of reversed trajectories need not be invariant with 
respect to the shape of the phase space region.   
 
But does this language of fibrillation – of the non-invariance of the shape of some region at 
time t, 𝑇𝑡𝑀𝑎-  not surreptitiously flout the ‘parity-of-reasoning’ argument? The appeal to 
Liouville’s theorem assumes that the evolution of the system develops from an ordered to a 
less ordered state, in accordance with the Second law. In order to fully respect the force of 
the parity-of-reasoning argument and not to assume that a system is in an initial low-
entropy condition, it is best not to postulate a particular state of entropy, as in standard 
universe models. 
Although notions like ‘fibrillation’ and ‘spreading’ have an intuitive physical appeal, in the 
statistical-mechanical literature spreading usually refers to the realisability of the macro-
state with respect to the available combinations of micro-states. Realisability describes the 
number of micro-states, which are compatible with or make up a given macro-state, as 
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reflected in Boltzmann’s definition of entropy: 𝑆 = 𝑘𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑉 (where V is the volume of the 
coarse grained region, which contains X). It is tempting to argue that the realisability of 
different configurations ‘extracts a direction of time even though the molecular collisions 
which give rise to the diffusion of the gas are each time-reversible.’ (Landsberg 1982b, 75; 
cf. Kupervasser et al. 2012) For if a system has a greater degree of realisability available to 
its macro-states – a greater amount of spreading into the available phase space –, this 
evolution could serve as a criterion for an arrow of time. 
According to the parity-of-reasoning argument probabilities are t-symmetric and hence do 
not allow to extract an arrow of time. The double-standard fallacy is committed when an 
unjustified favouring of initial over final conditions occurs, which seems to make the Second 
law a tautology. The realisability argument has the advantage that it does not need to 
invoke initial conditions. It appeals to ‘molecular collisions’ to explain the evolution towards 
equilibrium. The realisability of more macro-states from fewer macro-states is more likely 
than the realisability of fewer macro-states from more macro-states because of the shape 
difference between accessed and accessible phase space regions. As mentioned above, 
Eddington treated the volume ratios |𝑀𝑖|/ |𝑀𝑒𝑞| as a separate criterion for the arrow of 
time. The increasing arrow of time can therefore be understood as a function of the ratio of 
occupied to available phase space. These occupied regions of phase space are regarded as 
statistically irreversible, whilst the equations of motion, which govern the trajectories, 
remain time-reversal invariant.  According to some recent estimates a return of all the 
particles in a two-chamber system to just one chamber has a probability of 10−6𝑥10
22
 and 
the mean time <T> for such an occurrence is of the order of 106𝑥10
22
s, the estimated age of 
the earth. (See D’Abramo 2012) 
But such an appeal to realisability tacitly assumes that there is no future constraint, which 
acts on the current state. (Price 1996, 47)  Or, in metaphorical terms, that there is no deus 
ex machina – Loschmidt’s Demon (see Weinert 2016, Part III) – who is able to achieve the 
fine-tuning that would be required to ensure a reversal of the trajectories (phase flows) to 
their previous low-entropy configuration. Although on empirical grounds such a future 
constraint can probably be excluded, it enjoys equal probability on logical grounds. But then 
the realisability argument seems to commit the double standard fallacy: realisability is 
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greater towards the future than towards the past but from a purely statistical point of view, 
realisability should be equally likely in both directions.  
It seems that as long as the argument is formulated in terms of probabilities, motivated by 
the desire to avoid the double standard fallacy, a commitment to a Gold-type or t-
symmetric universe is unavoidable, despite its empirical implausibility. (Note that it is 
possible to justify probability measures as typicality measures, as argued in Volchan [2003] 
and Werndl [2013]).The next section will therefore address the question whether 
realisability can be saved if realisability in one direction can be said to be more typical than 
realisability in the opposite direction. If this strategy worked it would undermine the t-
symmetry of statistical reasoning and question the logical viability of the Gold universe. The 
proposal here is to characterize the topology of phase space by appeal to volume ratios, 
without reference to the notion of entropy. 
IV. Typicality 
Why does time-asymmetric behaviour occur? There have been a number of tentative 
answers to this question. They appeal to the Past Hypothesis in connection with the Second 
law, interventionism and external environmental disturbances. (Cf. Sklar 1993; Kupervasser 
et al. 2012) But all these approaches assume asymmetry and fall foul, in one way or 
another, of the parity-of-reasoning fallacy. In this connection it is worth considering 
Earman’s ‘Time Direction Heresy’ (Earman 1974), according to which the arrow of time 
becomes a geometric feature of space-time, making the appeal to entropy seemingly 
redundant. This geometric approach makes space-time time-orientable so that the arrow of 
time is built into the modelled fabric of space-time. Although this approach invests space-
time with a conventional temporal direction, it does not invest it with a temporal arrow 
because a temporally orientable space-time is not the same as a temporally oriented space-
time. 
Temporal orientability is merely a necessary condition for defining the global arrow of time, 
but it does not provide a physical, nonarbitrary criterion for distinguishing between the two 
directions of time.’ (Castagnino et al. 2003, 2496; cf. Aiello et al. 2008; Lehmkuhl 2012) 
 As it turns out a temporally oriented space-time still requires ‘energy fluxes’, typically 
associated with the Second law, to establish temporal asymmetry. It is therefore 
appropriate for an evaluation of the parity-of-reasoning objection, which is concerned with 
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the system’s boundary conditions in a time-symmetric universe, to consider typicality 
approaches. In line with the above proposal these approaches characterize typicality as the 
ratio of overwhelmingly many to a small number of divergent cases. Typical cases follow the 
expected temporal evolution of the system towards equilibrium; atypical cases constitute 
rare entropy-decreasing evolutions. Do they escape the ‘parity-of-reasoning’ objection? 
In order to evaluate the ‘parity-of-reasoning’ argument, the following formulation of the 
typicality view will be used (Goldstein and Lebwitz 2004): ‘for any [micro-region] [𝑀𝑖] the 
relative volume of the set of micro-states [𝑥] in 𝑀𝑖  for which the Second law is violated (…) 
goes to zero rapidly (exponentially) in the number of atoms and molecules in the system.’ 
(Quoted in Frigg 2011, 84) Such a notion of typicality resembes the notion of weak t-
invariance (Landsberg 1982a, 8), since a weakly t-invariant process, such as diffusion and 
heat conduction, allows for its (improbable) time-reverse without violating the Second law 
of thermodynamics. But such processes are never observed in nature, hence their 
realisability is practically zero. These characterizations, which focus on volume ratios, seem 
to appeal to what will be dubbed here volume-ratio typicality, since they make an implicit 
appeal to the distinction between occupied and accessible phase space, their ratios and the 
non-invariance of the structural shape of initial and final conditions. It will be argued below 
that they hold the key to the avoidance of the double-standard fallacy without assuming a 
symmetric Gold universe. 
As this paper is not concerned with the question of the evolution of thermodynamic systems 
towards equilibrium, volume-ratio typicality in the present sense simply refers to the 
volume ratios of accessed and accessible phase-space volumes.  As all the notions reviewed 
so far failed to respect the parity-of-reasoning concern, the question imposes itself whether 
volume-ratio typicality arguments are not susceptible to the double fallacy argument?  The 
temporal neutrality of statistical relations means that in the fullness of time both small and 
large fluctuations will occur, and hence thermal fluctuations may give rise to highly ordered, 
low-entropy complex systems, like Boltzmann brains, in an otherwise high-entropy universe. 
One way out of this dilemma is to postulate low-entropy initial conditions, from which the 
Second law can then explain the evolution towards increasing equilibrium. But in order to 
protect this argument from the accusation of double standards, the low-entropy initial 
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condition of the universe cannot simply be ‘put in by hand’. However, typicality arguments 
assume that there are differences in the volumes of accessed phase spaces, for otherwise 
no ratio could be established. Does this not mean that typicality arguments also fall foul of 
the parity-of-reasoning objection because they assume that a low-entropy initial condition 
exists? How can such an initial measure be justified? On empirical grounds the assumption 
of a low-entropy initial condition is justified because all cosmological models (to the 
author’s knowledge) assume an initial low-entropy condition of our universe (even if it is 
part of the multiverse). But there are also plausibility arguments, which favour typicality 
approaches over the Gold universe. Typicality arguments do not assume, as symmetry 
considerations do, that what is theoretically possible is also equally probable. It is 
theoretically possible for a Loschmidt Demon to reverse all the trajectories in an evolved 
phase space but in an expanding universe there is practically no guarantee that the 
trajectories will exactly return to their initial conditions. Liouville’s theorem only guarantees 
an invariance of volume, not of shape. In the evolved phase space the smooth initial 
conditions have turned into final fibrillated conditions. The final conditions are not the time-
reverse of the initial conditions, which introduces a temporal asymmetry.  
One advantage of volume-ratio typicality arguments is that they are not based on 
probabilities; hence the problem of the t-invariance of probabilities does not immediately 
arise. These approaches do not start from the assumption of the temporal neutrality 
between initial and final conditions. They do not assume that all evolutions are equally 
probable. Earlier it was suggested that the topology of phase space should be characterized 
in terms of Liouville’s theorem. Usually Liouville’s theorem expresses the fact that the 
dynamics of the state of a system is volume-preserving but that the phase space is not 
shape-invariant. Hence the topology of the system changes over its thermodynamic 
evolution. According to typicality approaches the evolution to a fibrillated state is typical, 
whilst a return to a smooth, ordered state is atypical. Hence typicality approaches do not 
give rise to a demand for parity-of-reasoning: a quasi-identity of initial and final conditions is 
highly atypical, although it is not excluded. The number of degrees of freedom in a 
fibrillated state is much greater than in a smooth state, and hence their return to a more 
ordered state requires ‘perfect aiming’, which, given the physical constraints on a system, 
make it extremely atypical. A proponent of a t-symmetric model will ask by what right we 
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can assume that evolution towards the future will be typical. On the empirical level, a 
proponent of typicality can point to the cosmological fact that the universe is expanding at 
an accelerated pace and will – in the fullness of time – reach what the 19th century dubbed 
the ‘heat death’. On an epistemological level the proponent of typicality will, as will now be 
argued, appeal to plausibility arguments.  
A further reflection on a time-symmetric universe reveals the dynamical problems it faces, 
under the assumption of identical boundary conditions - where these boundary conditions 
can either be in a state of high or low entropy. It shows that typicality does not need to 
favour initial conditions and that temporal asymmetry is more plausible than temporal 
symmetry in a Gold universe.  
V. Typicality in a Gold universe 
The symmetry approach regards it as an advantage that there is no need for the stipulation 
of specific initial conditions. If we take the parity-of-reasoning approach seriously, two 
scenarios need to be considered: 
 Either the current state (of a Gold universe) evolved from a low-entropy state in the 
past and will again collapse to a lower entropy state in the future (Figure Ia).  
 Or the current state is an entropy-decreased fluctuation from a higher entropy state 
in the past such that it will again be higher in the future (Figure Ib) 
In a Gold universe, of either type, the current state of the system has reached a certain level 
of entropy but the two scenarios invite different questions. 
Question 1: How likely is it that the system evolves from a higher state of entropy, at 
t1present, to a lower state of entropy at t2final? (Figure Ia) This part of the evolution curve 
displays anti-thermodynamic behaviour and cannot be explained by appeal to the Second 
law. The Second law can only explain the thermodynamic behaviour from t0 to t1. Hence 
whilst the Gold universe respects the demand for parity of the boundary conditions, it 
requires a violation of dynamic symmetry for different parts of the evolution curve, because 
it implicitly assumes an asymmetry between anti-thermodynamic and thermodynamic 
behaviour. 
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Question 2: This question is a mirror image of the first question. How likely is it that the 
system will return to a state of lower entropy, from t0 to t1present? (Figure Ib) Again the parity 
of reasoning applies to the symmetry of boundary conditions but not to this part of the 
evolution curve itself, for only the phase t1t2 evolves in accordance with the Second law. 
Consider these scenarios in more detail: 
 If we start from the assumption, by the argument from parity, of high entropy states 
both at the beginning and the end of a system’s evolution, then on Boltzmann’s 
assumption the current state of a system, like the universe, is in a lower state of 
entropy, hence in a more ordered state. Such fluctuations have been dismissed as 
implausible (Carroll 2010, 221-4; Lebowitz 1994, 142; Price 1996, 35). A Boltzmann 
fluctuation would require an evolution of a more fibrillated state to a less fibrillated 
state. From the point of view of typicality, it would mean a change in the ratio of 
phase space volumes. A Boltzmann fluctuation would mean an atypical switch in the 
ratio of phase space volumes at some point on the evolution curve. Anti-
thermodynamic evolution would be atypical.   
 This asymmetry in typicality remains if we postulate an alternative Gold universe, 
with equal initial and final conditions of low entropy. Now the current state of the 
system is in a higher state of entropy than the initial condition, which is typical 
behaviour but the system is supposed to return to a lower state of entropy, hence an 
atypical, anti-thermodynamic evolution.  Such behaviour requires the postulation of 
constraints in the distant future, attractor states, which by retro-causality would 
have an effect on the current state. (Schulman 1997) Whether or not evidence for 
such a future constraint on present conditions exists, another atypical switch in 
volume ratios occurs.  
These typicality considerations do not favour initial over final conditions. They do not 
require ‘perfect aiming’ or an appeal to a Loschmidt demon, since they focus on the volume 
ratio of phase space occupied by respective regions. A Gold universe of either type must 
assume an atypical switch in volume ratios. This reversal of volume ratios means that a 
proponent of a Gold universe faces explanatory anomalies. 
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 If |𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠|is larger than |𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙| then the proponent of a Gold universe faces an 
explanatory anomaly. The ratio 
|𝑀𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠|
|𝑀𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙|
⁄ > 1 is atypical, whilst the ratio 
|𝑀𝑖|
|𝑀𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡|
⁄ ≪ 1 remains typical. (Figure 1a) 
 If, however,  |𝑀𝑖| is larger than|𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠|, then, in terms of typicality, a proponent of a 
Gold universe has to find a justification for the fact that the ratio 
|𝑀𝑖|
|𝑀𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠|
⁄ > 1 is 
atypical, whilst the ratio 
|𝑀𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠|
|𝑀𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙|
⁄ ≪ 1 remains typical. (Figure 1b) 
Under the assumption of the temporal neutrality of the evolution between boundary 
conditions, Gold universes require a drastic turn-around, at tpresent, of the volume ratio 
|𝑀𝑖|
|𝑀𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙|
⁄ to either
|𝛤𝑀𝑖|
|𝛤𝑀𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠|
⁄ > 1, if a high entropy past is assumed (Figure Ib), or 
to
|𝛤𝑀𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠|
|𝛤𝑀𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙|
⁄ > 1, if a low entropy future condition is envisaged. (Figure Ia) In both 
scenarios, the ratios flip at the ‘mid-term’ point – which is the current state –from the 
typical «1 to the atypical  1.  
But the move from t-symmetric probability to volume-ratio typicality (as an implication of 
Liouville’s theorem) does not force us to adopt particular boundary conditions. The 
observed cosmological asymmetry depends solely on the ratio of the initial to the final 
phase state condition:
|𝑀𝑖|
|𝑀𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙|
⁄ 10−10
123
, where |𝑀𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙| is the total available 
volume (Lebowitz 1994, 141; cf. D’Abramo 2012, §2) The usual complaint against standard 
cosmological models is that they can only explain the observed ‘arrow’ of time if they 
stipulate low-entropy initial conditions. They can be assumed on empirical grounds. But the 
proponent of typicality can advance plausibility arguments against the Gold universe. 
Even on the assumption of the parity of boundary conditions, Gold models face a dynamic 
switch-over problem in terms of phase space volume ratios. In both scenarios the ratio 
changes at the ‘mid-term point’ = the current state, from «1 to ˃ 1, on one part of the 
evolution curve:  either in the phase t1t2 (Figure Ia) or in the phase t0t1 (Figure Ib). On 
both scenarios the switch-over problem remains unexplained and violates the typicality 
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requirement.  Whilst Gold universes are unlikely on empirical grounds, their explanatory 
anomalies make them implausible on dynamic grounds. 
VI. Conclusion 
The t-symmetric statistical argument demands that all microstates ‘consistent with a given 
macro-state have equal weight.’ (Schulman 1997, §2.6) On this account, it is theoretically 
possible for 50% of air molecules in a room at normal temperature to travel at 1000mph 
and 50% to travel at 3000mph to arrive at the average speed of 2000mph, which 
corresponds to room temperature. But even on the statistical approach this does not mean 
that the corresponding macro-states are equally probable. The typicality argument can be 
understood as an argument for the inequality: equally possible   equally probable. Hence 
some macro-states are overwhelmingly more likely than others. In particular (in a departure 
from the parity-of-reasoning approach) the initial and final macro-conditions are not equally 
typical. And this typicality can be understood in terms of the volume of the phase space 
regions, which are occupied by the macro-states.  If the ratio 
|𝑚𝑎𝑥|
|𝑚𝑖𝑛|
⁄  is of the order 
of 1010
123
 (see Penrose 1990, Chap. 7), where typicality would lead us to expect that |𝑚𝑎𝑥| 
to be highly fibrillated, then the return to a much smaller volume of phase space is 
extremely unlikely, not only on physical but also on theoretical grounds. The coherence 
condition or the ‘perfect aiming’ required for this to happen is minute in a universe, which 
undergoes cosmological expansion. But typicality arguments can dispense with a deus ex 
machina or ‘perfect aiming’, since they make the evolution towards lower-entropy attractor 
states atypical because they would require an unexplained switch of volume ratios.  
The parity-of-reasoning argument extends the basic assumption of statistical mechanics to 
the demand that initial and final conditions of a system (like the universe) be treated as 
equally probable. The favouring of initial over final conditions is unjustified. But on the 
typicality approach all evolutions are equally possible but not equally probable. Some 
evolutions are typical whilst other evolutions are atypical. The volume-ratio notion of 
typicality does not favour initial over final conditions and hence evades the parity-of-
reasoning objection. But it turns out that avoidance of temporal chauvinism and double 
standards (as in a Gold universe) leads to a double standard of its own kind since at tpresent an 
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unexpected, unexplained and unjustified reversal of the ratios in the phase space volumes is 
required. Whilst the Gold universe is already doubtful on empirical grounds these 
plausibility considerations add further reasons to its unacceptability. If the demand for 
symmetry is maintained, alternative cosmological models, with pre-big-bang and post-big-
bang periods, must be considered. These models retain entropic gradients and temporal 
asymmetry on part of the evolution curves, even though the multiverse, in which they are 
embedded, is taken to be symmetric in time. 
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